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Environmental and Energy Policies
G.S. Peter Bergen*
I. Introduction
Regulated entities1  need stable and predictable
environmental rules to implement major long-term projects
and to efficiently conduct their daily business operations.
They need to know what will be expected of them by the
government in order to plan, design, finance, and build.
The environmental regulatory system, however, is often
characterized by instability and uncertainty. Rules are
frequently changed during the various stages of planning,
construction, licensing, and operation. Regulated entities
must constantly follow changing developments in the
regulatory fabric to learn about new requirements for
environmental compliance, how those requirements affect
operations, and how to finance the cost of compliance.
* Partner, Leboeuf, Lamb, Leiby & Macrae, New York, New York. Member of the
Bar of New York and the District of Columbia. This article is based on an address
given by the author at a meeting of the Federal Bar Council, February 2, 1984.
1. While the public perception seems to be that private industry is responsible
for "pollution" and environmental compliance, the environmental laws also
impact heavily on local, state, and federal agencies which operate facilities.
Consider, for example, municipal sewage tratment works, see Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1281-97 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)(construction grants); garbage disposal
sites, see Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949(1976 &
Supp. V 1981); and incinerators, see Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e) (Supp. V
1981) (defines "person" to include municipalities, states, and federal agencies).
Similarly, environmental standards affect military operations, see Romero-
Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835, 861 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981)(the
discharge of any pollutant under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981), includes the Navy's dropping of ordnance into coastal waters).
Highway construction is frequently challenged under the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) or
other acts. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971);
Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 541 F. Supp. 1367 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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Shifting and unrealistic environmental policies and
interpretations can severely impede the overall
environmental and energy regulatory systems' objectives of
a "clean" environment with reliable and inexpensive
energy supplies. Examples of resultant inconsistency and
contradiction can be found in the hazardous waste and
nuclear regulatory schemes. Moreover, proposed legislative
measures 2 to regulate "acid rain" appear to have a similar
potential to interfere with overall policy objectives of
environmental and energy regulation.
II. Background
A. Federal & State Regulation
At the present time, a complex federal-state regulatory
program affects virtually all activities, whether existing or
proposed, which result in emissions to air, discharges to
water, or disposal of wastes on land, or which have
significant impacts on land or resource use.3 Agency
regulations have expanded and developed at an astounding
pace over the past fifteen years, producing an enormous
volume of rules requiring implementation. The United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) alone has
promulgated nine volumes of environmental regulations in
2. S. 2001, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec. 14528 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1983)
(introduced by Sen. Durenberger); H.R. 3400,98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec.
4773 (daily ed. June 23, 1983) (introduced by Rep. Waxman); S. 768,98th Cong., lot
Sess., 129 Cong. Rec. 2547 (daily ed. March 10, 1983) (introduced by Sen. Stafford).
3. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370
(1976 & Supp. V 1981); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. V 1981); Clean
Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. V
1981); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. V
1981); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, § 208,43 U.S.C. §
1344 (Supp. V 1981). States have enacted corresponding legistation. See, e.g., N.Y.
Envtl. Conserv. Law §§ 19-010 to 0711 (air pollution control); §§ 17-0101 to 1907
(water pollution control); §§ 27-0101 to 0301 (solid waste treatment and disposal); §§
8-0101 to 0115 (environmental quality review) (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1983). See
also infra note 6 (state air, water, and solid waste laws reprinted in Env't Rep.
(BNA)).
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the Code of Federal Regulations over the last fourteen
years.4 Since the program involves states as well as the
federal government in a "delicate partnership," 5 the fifty
states have generally responded with comparable rules.6
Moreover, individual agency policies have shifted and been
amended almost continuously since 1970 in response to
legislation, 7 court decisions, 8 and political factors.9
Implementing these complex programs has been a
formidable challenge. For example, EPA and state
environmental regulatory agencies face immense
management problems in administering these ambitious
programs, in addition to the more obvious problems of
implementing basic policies in response to legislation.
These legislative programs generally reflect the demands of
the public and its growing concern for the environment. The
public at large clearly wants a "clean environment."
However, the public is buffeted by conflicting notions of
what is "clean," and what the costs and benefits are. Thus,
regulations often reflect public preference while neglecting
operational reality-the certainty and predictability
required by regulated entities for compliance.
4. See Protection of the Environment, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1-424 (1983) (includes air
program, §§ 50-87; water program, §§ 100-149; pesticides, §§ 162-180; ocean
dumping, §§ 220-231; solid waste program, §§ 240-267; superfund, § 300; effluent
guidelines, §§ 401-466).
5. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 421 U.S. 60 (1975); Union
Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
6. See [State Air Laws] Env't Rep. (BNA) 301:0101-556:0501; [State Water Laws]
Env't Rep. (BNA) 701:0101-956:1041; [State Solid Waste -- Land Use] Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1101:0101-1356:2501.
7. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. V 1981);
Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); See also S.
757, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 1363, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 2867,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (pending amendments to the Solid Waste Disposal
Act).
8. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975). See also
EPA Memorandum, Proposal to Amend EPA's PSD and Nonattainment NSR
Regulations [14 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 601 (July 21, 1983).
9. For instance, compare the policies of leasing federal lands for oil and gas
exploration under the Carter and Reagan administrations.
3
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In addition, courts are confronted with novel and complex
environmental cases, often based on poorly drafted
statutes, 10 containing highly technical, lengthy, factual
records." The "arbitrary and capricious" and "substantial
evidence" standards of review set forth in the
Administrative Procedure Act, 12 require that the federal
courts defer to the agencies' policy choices and technical
interpretations of the facts. 13 Accordingly, the judicial
decisions are more often based on procedural grounds
rather than substantive technical merit. 4
B. Uncertainties in Licensing
A number of cases have involved the overlay of
environmental laws to plans to develop energy projects,
such as nuclear plants,1 5 coal conversions, 16 hydroelectric
plants,' 7  offshore oil and gas drilling,1S electric
10. Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979). United States v.
Wade, C.A. 79-1426, slip op. (E.D. Pa. December 20,1983). See United States v. A. &
F. Materials Co., 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1353, 1357 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (hastily and
inadequately drafted statute).
11. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied 426 U.S.
941 (1976); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conf. v. F.P.C., 453 F.2d 463, 469 (2d Cir. 1971).
12. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706(e) (1982).
13. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448
U.S. 607, 656 (1980) (courts must generally defer to an agency when it is making
predictions within its area of expertise).
14. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983) (disallows substantive review of the agency's generic
rulemaking). Compare Sierra Club v. EPA, 719 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(remanding EPA rules with an opinion analyzing the technical aspects of
appropriate heights for smokestacks).
15. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 103 S.
Ct. 2246 (1983); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Co. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
16. Environmental Defense Fund v. Flacke, 96 A.D.2d 862, 465 N.Y.S.2d 759
(1983).
17. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971); Power
Authority of N.Y. v. Williams, 60 N.Y.2d 315, 457 N.E.2d 726, 496 N.Y.S.2d 620
(1983).
18. Secretary of the Interior v. California, 104 S. Ct. 656 (1984).
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol1/iss2/2
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transmission lines,19 and coal mines. 20 Federal 2' and state22
licensing and regulation of construction of energy facilities
typically require construction permits to be compatible with
environmental requirements, interposing the full panoply
of hearing and public debates under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 23 and comparable state
"little NEPA" laws.24 The complex licensing and
environmental proceedings and appellate review can take
months and sometimes years, 25  and spawn related
19. Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Sands, 711 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1983); Detroit
Edison Co. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 630 F.2d 450 (6th Cir.
1980).
20. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981); Hodel v. Virginia Surface & Mining
Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
21. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 2705 (1982); Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
2131-2141 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §717(f) (1982); Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1263 (Supp. V 1981).
22. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law §§ 121-126, 141-149 (McKinney Supp. 1983); Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 38 §§ 481-489 (1964 & Supp. 1983); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 116C.51-
116C.69 (West 1976 & Supp. 1984).
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4332 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
24. See, e.g., N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 8 (McKinney Supp. 1983). See also
Robinson, SEQRA 's Siblings: Precedents from Little NEPA 's in the Sister States,
46 Alb. L. Rev. 1155 (1982).
25. For example, the licensing proceedings and judicial review related to
Consolidated Edison's application for construction of the Cornwall pumped-
storage hydroelectric project lasted for 18 years. Consolidated Edison applied to
the Federal Power Commission (FPC) for a license in 1963. After hearings, the
license was granted in 1965. 33 FPC 428 (1965). The license was remanded for
further hearings in 1965, Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d
608 (2d Cir. 1965), and after futher hearings, was reissued in 1970, 44 FPC 350
(1970). The second license was upheld on review in 1971. Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
926 (1972). The license proceedings were reopened in 1974, Hudson River
Fishermens' Ass'n v. FPC, 498 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1974), causing Consolidated
Edison to suspend construction of the project, which had only begun a few months
earlier. The 1974 suspension of construction coincided with Consolidated Edison's
cash flow difficulties resulting from the Arab oil embargo. The company's
financial problems were resolved by the late 1970's, but the company surrendered the
license in 1981, 14 FERC 62,098, July 23, 1981, as part of a settlement of
environmental litigation involving whether closed-cycle cooling systems should
be installed at its nuclear plant and other plants on the Hudson River. See Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. EPA, 587 F.2d 549 (2 Cir. 1978). By the time the
license was surrendered, the original cost of the project had escalated by a factor of
5
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lawsuits.26
Throughout the period of licensing and environmental
hearings, the project's proponent is subject to a wide variety
of uncertainties. These include whether to purchase or
condemn land for the project, whether to expend funds for
final engineering plans (and if so, for which alternative
plan), and whether or when to borrow funds for
construction. These uncertainties are sometimes
compounded by new legislation, enacted during pending
licensing proceedings, imposing new procedural and
substantive requirements. 27 Changing economic conditions
during this process can alter the original need for a
project.28
C. Compartmentalization of Agency Implementation
It is inevitable that different segments of agencies will
specialize in regulating individual segments of the overall
system. But, from time to time, it should not be forgotten
that the individual segments of the regulatory framework
are only parts of a single regulatory system.
Not often is consideration given to linkage among policies
concerning hazardous waste, nuclear energy, and acid rain.
Thinking is normally compartmentalized-divided by the
enormous complexity of any one of the three topics, and
even by the institutional structures of government agencies
ten, nuclear energy for pumping the project was not available, and alternative
measures had been adopted to supply the peaking energy which the project was
intended to provide.
26. See, e.g., Power Authority of N.Y. v. Williams, 60 N.Y.2d 315,457 N.E.2d 726,,
469 N.Y.S.2d 620; DeRham v. Diamond, 32 N.Y.2d 34,295 N.E.2d 763,343 N.Y.S.2d
84 (1973).
27. See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 50-34(b)(6)(v) (1983) (requiring applicants for nuclear
plant construction and operating licenses to submit "emergency plans"). On the
basis of this newly issued requirement (45 Fed. Reg. 55402-18 (1980)) Seacoast
Anti-Pollution League of New Hampshire attempted to secure suspension or
revocation of construction permits granted to Public Service Company of New
Hampshire four years before. Seacoast Anti-Pollution League of New Hampshire
v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 690 F.2d 1025 (1982).
28. See supra note 25.
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themselves. For example, EPA's and the states' hazardous
and solid waste staff deal only with solid and hazardous
waste disposals and clean-ups. 29 Similarly, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulates construction and
operation of nuclear reactors.30 The generated nuclear
wastes are regulated under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of
1982, and not under the hazardous waste laws discussed
here.31 Also, acid rain, if and when explicitly regulated, will
no doubt come under the jurisdiction of EPA and state air
regulatory personnel. 32 Compartmentalized structure can
result in policy choices which emphasize the particular
interests of the personnel responsible for developing the
policy. Air division staff, for example, may opt for reduced
air emissions wihout sufficient consideration of land, water,
or energy impacts. 33
D. Interrelated Environmental Areas
Almost daily, newspapers report new developments about
hazardous waste, acid rain, or nuclear power plants.
29. See Directory of Environmental Officials, Chemical Engineering, Oct. 17,
1977, at 9 (An organization chart for the EPA and a listing of state water and air
control agencies). See also [Federal Regulations] Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 101:0091-
101:0099.
30. Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2284 (1976). The Atomic Energy
Commission's juridiction over nuclear'safety is exclusive. See Power Reactor Dev.
Co. v. International Union of Elec., Radio, & Machine Workers, 367 U.S. 396 (1961).
However, federal agency jurisdiction does not preempt state power entirely. See
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State
Energy Resources Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983).
31. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425,1982 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News (96 Stat.) 2201 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 10101); Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (Supp. V 1981).
32. Acid rain bills, still pending in Congress, have been proposed as
amendments of the Clean Air Act: S. 768, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983); H.R. 3400,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
33. See, e.g., United Petroleum Assoc. v. Williams,-Misc. 2d-, 471 N.Y.S.2d 1007
(Sup. Ct., Albany County, Dec. 1983) which annulled certain air regulations of the
New York Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) because DEC's air
staff failed to consider water pollution impacts of the rule. (Notice of appeal filed
by DEC, Jan. 30, 1984).
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However, there is little understanding of practical
interrelationships among hazardous waste, acid rain, and
nuclear policy choices.
The controversy about the origin of acid rain and possible
ways to deal with it provides a good example of the
impracticalities and uncertainties that can result from not
interrelating issues in energy and environmental policies.
For instance, acid rain policy must be interrelated with
hazardous or solid waste policy. Fossil fuels, like coal and
oil, typically contain varying amounts of sulfur, which,
when burned, cause oxides of sulfur (SO2)3 4 to be emitted to
the atmosphere. While other emissions, such as nitrogen
oxides (NO2)35 from fossil fuel boilers and vehicle engines,
are also said to contribute to acidification of rainfall, SO 2 is
most frequently cited in the media as the cause of acid
rain.36
Bills have been introduced in Congress which propose
acid rain solutions by limiting or "capping" total SO 2
emissions 37 from power generators. The bills are either
national in scope or apply only to power generators in the
eastern United States. 38 Adoption of some of these bills
34. Since sulfur dioxide is the most abundant of the various sulfur oxides
emitted to the atmosphere, the designation SO 2 will be used.
35. W. Chameides and D. Davis, Chemistry in the Troposphere, Chemical and
Engineering News, Oct. 4, 1982, at 39,49. NO 2 is used to designate NO, NO 2 , N 20,
and NO 3. Id. at 47.
36. Electric utilities account for over two-thirds of the total man-made emissions
of sulfur oxides and approximately one-third of the nitrogen oxide emissions.
Almost half of the nitrogen oxide emissions are from the exhaust pipes of
automobiles, trucks and buses. M. Wayne, Clarifying the Scientific Unknowns,
EPRI J., Nov. 1983, at 8 (a journal by Electrical Power Research Institute); N.Y.
Times, Jan. 25, 1984, at A14, col. x. See EPA, The Acidic Deposition Phenomenon
and its Effects: Critical Assessment Review Papers (EP.-600/8-83-016A, May
1983). See also Acid Precipitation Task Force, 1982 Ann. Rep. (report required to
be submitted to the President and Congress by Jan. 15 pursuant to the Acid
Precipitation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 770). See generally, National
Research Council, Acid Deposition: Atmosphere Processes in Eastern North
America (1983).
37. H.R. 3400 would require a ten million ton annual reduction in SO 2 emissions
by 1993 at a cost estimated to exceed $100 billion. Estimate by Temple, Barker and
Sloan (Jan. 1984) (consultants to Edison Electric Institute).
38. See supra note 2.
[Vol. 1
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would mean that more expensive "scrubbing" facilities
would be added to generating units to remove ninety percent
or more SO 2 before exhaust gases are emitted to the
atmosphere. 39 Removing SO 2 from exhaust gases by "flue
gas desulfurization" (FGD) creates a waste product called
scrubber sludge, which has a toothpaste-like consistency. 40
Scrubber sludge is disposed of on land. At present, this
sludge41 is considered "solid waste" under federal rules. 42
However, a 1980 amendment to the federal solid waste law43
requires that EPA reconsider whether scrubber wastes
should be classified as "hazardous." 44 EPA has not yet
submitted its finding to Congress. 45
Thus, acid rain bills have the potential to require utilities
to create "hazardous" waste. They clearly would require
creation of solid wastes. However, none of these bills
address the problem of siting landfill facilities for scrubber
sludges. Because the acid rain bills do not address the issue
of sludge disposal, it is presumed that this disposal will be
accomplished under state and local laws. Uncertainty in the
regulation of the entire area of acid rain is therefore created,
as landfill siting, an attendant step in the disposal process,
is extremely controversial 46 and subject to lengthy delays.
39. Parkinson, A Shot of Limestone May Cure S0 2 Removal Woes, Chemical
Engineering, Feb. 20, 1984, at 30.
40. See generally, Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
41. Scrubber sludge normally refers to waste products from scrubbing units,
such as FGD systems. In this article, the term is used to include coal ash -the
inorganic residue that remains after coal has been burnt. Although the
compositions of scrubber sludge and coal ash are substantially different, disposal
problems are similar.
42. 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(4) (1983).
43. Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-482, 94 Stat.
2334 (amending scattered sections of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§6901-6987 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981)).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 6982(n) (Supp. V 1981).
45. EPA's report on whether coal ash and scrubber sludge should be classified
as "hazardous" was due in October, 1982. See 42 U.S.C.§ 6982(n)(Supp. V 1981).
Industry sources are optimistic that a report will be filed in 1984, and that EPA will
determine not to classify coal ash and scrubber sludge as hazardous, because
leachates from ash and sludge landfills do not significantly threaten groundwater
supplies with heavy metal pollution.
46. S. Epstein, L. Brown, and C. Pope, Hazardous Waste in America 38 (1982).
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Acid rain policy is also related to nuclear energy policy.
For example, an increase in the number of nuclear
generating plants would reduce reliance on fossil fuels used
to generate electric energy. 47 The corresponding abatement
of SO 2 emissions would result in a reduction in acid
precipitation.
There should be, accordingly, consideration of the
relationship among hazardous waste, nuclear energy, and
acid rain policies. A closer examination of these topics will
reveal their relationships and the conflicts in implementing
specific environmental policies.
III. Hazardous Waste
The existence of hazardous landfill and illegal dumping
sites, which create substantial threats to public health, is a
culmination of circumstances and events not entirely
predicated on the irresponsibility of the landfill owners and
operators. The situation exemplifies the role of the
regulatory process in creating, rather than solving
problems in several respects. Compartmentalized
legislation that failed initially to deal adequately with solid
and hazardous wastes became coupled with subsequent
regulatory failure to facilitate an emerging waste recycling
industry. Looking at the overall picture, one can infer that
the regulatory process itself shares responsibility with the
waste generators on whom ultimate liability for remedial
action has been imposed.
A. Congressional Encouragement of Waste Treatment
The 1974 Arab oil embargo greatly stimulated the concept
of reclaiming waste solvents.48 The ten-fold crude oil price
increase made recycling attractive to entrepreneurs.
47. See Nuclear Power's Uphill Battle, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20,1984, at Dl, col. 3.
48. Solvents are organic chemical liquids derived from petroleum.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol1/iss2/2
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Recycling was encouraged by Congress 49 in the 1976
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 50 (RCRA) that
advocated the use of "alternative fuels." 51
Similarly, the need for solvent recovery and waste
recycling was raised by the Clean Water Act (CWA) 52 of
1972 which prohibits water pollution. 53 By 1975, businesses
generating waste solvents had obtained wastewater
discharge permits limiting the amounts of pollutants which
could be discharged and requiring monthly monitoring
reports to be filed. Since waste solvents and certain other
wastes could not lawfully be discharged into the sewer,
businesses collected and sold their waste solvents or paid to
have them removed. Solvent recovery and waste treatment
companies emerged. The solids removed from effluent
discharge streams in response to CWA regulations then had
to be landfilled. Air pollution control facilities installed in
response to the Clean Air Act54 collected particulates from
smoke stack gases. These were also landfilled along with
the scrubber sludge described earlier.55 In some cases, these
solids were mixed with hazardous wastes, or themselves
may have been "hazardous" under EPA's sweeping
definition of the term.56
B. RCRA, an Inadequate Remedy
In 1976 Congress attempted to close the "gap" in
environmental regulation, previously focused on air and
water pollution control, by enacting RCRA. 57 RCRA
49. 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (1976).
50. 42 U.S.C. § § 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(1976). Congress found that solid waste is a potential source
of fuel and that there was a need to reduce dependence on petroleum, gas, nuclear
energy, and hydroelectric generation. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
52. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
53. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
54. 42 U.S.C.§§ 7401-7642 (Supp. V 1981).
55. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
56. See infra note 73.
57. See supra note 50.
11
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imposed standards 58 for solid waste disposal 59 and for
hazardous waste treatment,60 storage61 and disposal.6 2
These standards include a complex system of "cradle-to-
grave" manifesting and reporting so that the generation,
transport, treatment, and final disposition of all hazardous
wastes would be recorded.6 3 Every hazardous waste
generator, storer, treator, and disposer is subject to RCRA's
detailed requirements, which involve minimum regulatory
standards set by the EPA, with licensing and enforcement
by the states.6 4
Between 1977 and 1980, the recycling facilities classified
within RCRA's rubric of treatment, storage and disposal
facility operators6 5 (TSDFs) were subject to tremendous
uncertainty. New rules, conflicting requirements, and
confusion paralyzed these operators, including the solvent
recovery operators.66 Some couldn't get permits from the
states because the states didn't have rules in place. Others
did obtain state permits. Most could not raise money to
finance new facilities, in part because of lenders' concerns
that the investment would soon be outdated by new rules.
State regulatory agencies could not provide a clear
framework that regulated entities could use in planning
efforts. This was even an impediment to planning two or
three years ahead, considering that the building and
equipment they would have to purchase to comply with
58. At the present time, RCRA is still not fully implemented. Most
transportation, storage, and disposal facilities (TSDFs) are still operating under
interim authority. 40 C.F.R. pt. 265 (1983). Few TSDFs have received final permits.
40 C.F.R. pt. 266 (1983).
59. 42 U.S.C.§§ 6941-6949 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (standards were to be promulgated no
later than April 21, 1978).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6924 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
64. See 40 C.F.R. pts. 260-264 (1983). See also N.Y. Admin. Code tit. 6, pt. 360
(1983).
65. See 40 C.F.R. § 6.1002 (1983).
66. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983); United
States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1334 (S.D. Ind. 1982).
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regulations had depreciable lives of ten years or more.
Another problem was that treatment and landfill sites
were difficult to locate, tending to give monopolistic power
to the few hazardous waste treatment and disposal facilities
already in existence. Moreover, pricing of disposal services
was based on what the traffic would bear. This acted as a
disincentive to dipose of hazardous wastes properly, since
some generators may have opted to dispose of their wastes
through the cheapest, but not the most effective recycler. 67
Public reaction was also a problem for waste handlers.
The public reacted against licensing of sanitary and
hazardous waste landfills.68 No one would tolerate a
hazardous waste facility in his backyard. The combination
of federal and state environmental impact laws enabled
environmental groups to delay or stop proposed treatment
facilities and landfills.6 9 The resulting uncertainty in the
licensing process while siting disputes were heard added
heavily to the hazardous waste recycler's woes. Many
reclaimers whose operators were frustrated by shifting and
unclear requirements, went bankrupt. 70 In many cases,
landfills which endangered the public's health became
inactive and were abandoned. 71
C. Superfund to the Rescue?
In an effort to confront the problems posed by inactive
and abandoned waste disposal sites, Congress hastily
67. This suggests that consideration should be given to franchising and rate
regulation of hazardous waste treatment and disposal operators. This would
require recyclers and TSDFs to take specific kinds of wastes at prices set by
governmental authorities, akin to public service commissions. If effectively set up
and operated, this kind of regulation could discourage illegal disposal by
providing generators with assured places to dispose of waste, at rates which apply
equally to all users.
68. Epstein, Brown, and Pope, supra note 46, at 37-38.
69. O'Leary v. Moyer's Landfill, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 642 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Niagara
Recycling, Inc. v. Town Board of Niagara, 56 N.Y.2d 859, 438 N.E.2d 1142, 453
N.Y.S.2d 427 (1982); SCA Chem. Waste Serv., Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Porter, 52
N.Y.2d 963, 419 N.E.2d 872, 437 N.Y.S.2d 969 (1981).
70. See supra note 66.
71. Id. and Epstein, Brown and Pope, supra note 46, at 303.
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enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA or
"Superfund") 72 in the closing days of the Carter
administration. CERCLA authorizes EPA to undertake
removal and remedial action whenever "any hazardous
substance 73 is released 74 or there is a substantial threat of
such release"75 into groundwaters, surface waters, or the
air. 76 Liability is imposed for the costs of waste removal and
related remedial action 77 and for "damage to natural
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (Supp. V 1981), H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 22, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6125.
73. EPA's rules designate as "hazardous" a wide variety of waste materials
from dioxin to less toxic or offensive materials such as printing inks. See 40 C.F.R.
pt. 261 (1983). States tend to adopt EPA's list of hazardous wastes. See, e.g., N.Y.
Admin. Code tit. 6, pt. 366 (1984). Note, however, that a New York court has held
invalid New York's effort to incorporate the EPA list of hazardous wastes by
reference into the state rules. People v. Attic Metals Indus., N.Y.L.J., Jan. 31,1984,
at 1, col. 2 (Co. Ct. Suffolk County). Some states have made additions to the EPA
list. The New York rules, for example, provide that a waste is "discarded" when it
is burned as a fuel to recover heat. N.Y. Admin. Code tit. 6, §366.1 (c)(ii) (1984). EPA
excludes burning a waste as fuel from the definition of "discarded" materials. 40
C.F.R. § 261.2(C)(2) (1983). Thus, in New York, waste automotive engine oil used as
fuel is "hazardous" if it contains lead from leaded gasoline and demonstrates an
"EP toxicity" of more than five parts per million of lead. Under EPA's rules, such
oil used as fuel is not discarded, and therefore not a hazardous waste.
74. "Releases" have been defined in CERCLA cases as seepage of waste
chemicals from landfills. See supra note 66. CERCLA defines "removal" as:
[T]he cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the
environment, such actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the threat
of release of hazardous substances into the environment, such actions as may
be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release of hazardous
substances, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of such other actions
as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public
health or welfare or the environment, which may otherwise result from a release
or threat of release.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (Supp. V 1981).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. V 1981).
77. CERCLA defines "remedial action" as:
[T]hose actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in
addition to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release of a
hazardous substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize the release
of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial
danger to present or future public health or welfare or the environment.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (Supp. V 1981). See also 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (Supp. V 1981).
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol1/iss2/2
1983] CONFLICT IN IMPLEMENTING POLICIES 137
resources." 78 Persons held liable79 are:
1) those who create the wastes (generators);8 0
2) those who owned the landfills and reprocessing centers
(site owners); 81 and
3) those who transported the wastes from the generator's
place of business to the landfill (transporters).8 2
Courts have determined that liability under CERCLA is
joint and several, 83 retroactive,8 4 and absolute.85 The
following hypothetical demonstrates how compliance with
the regulatory scheme in this area does not necessarily
absolve the waste generator from future liability.
A manufacturer who sent ten drums of waste ink solvents
to a state-permitted recycling facility in 1975, for treatment
or use as fuel, might find itself liable in 1984 for the full costs
of cleanup and natural resource damages at the entire site.
Perhaps a total of a million drums of solid or hazardous
waste were sent to that site by 500 or more generators and
transporters over many years. Typically, the generators
whose wastes were sent to the site, the "deep pockets ," are
sued in federal court. 86 The landfill site owner, being
bankrupt, is judgment-proof. In most cases, he probably
had no liability insurance or his property carrier may have
78. 42 U.S.C. § 9797(a) (Supp. V 1981).
79. Id.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (Supp. V 1981). This provision generally covers any
party who arranges for the transport of hazardous substances. See United States
v. Price, No. 80-4140, slip op. (July 28, 1983).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
82. 42 U.S.C.§ 9607(a)(4) (Supp. V 1981).
83. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., No. 80-5066-
CV-5-4 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 1984); United States v. Wade, No. 79-1426 (E.D. Pa. Dec.
20, 1983); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (all
holding that liability is joint and several if the defendants caused an indivisible
harm).
84. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., No. 80-5066-
CV-5-4 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 1984) (liability applies to acts performed before
CERCLA was enacted).
85. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., No.805066-CV-64
(W.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 1984); United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981)
(both holding that strict liability applies); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572
F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
86. See supra notes 84, 85.
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denied coverage because the insured intended that his site
be covered with wastes.
As a result of this kind of pattern, complex multi-
defendant cases like United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp.,
United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., United States v.
Environmental Conservation & Chemical Corp., and
United States v. Stringfellow87 are pending in the federal
courts. These generators, who in a good faith effort to
comply with the law, sent their waste to solvent and waste
recovery operators instead of dumping it thoughtlessly, are
being made to pay the costs of cleanup of the abandoned
sites. Most, if not all, of those who illegally dumped their
wastes in sewers escaped liability.
D. Summary
The energy policies and developments of 1974-1976
motivated entrepreneurs to enter the resource recovery
business, but subsequent policy shifts and legal
uncertainties since the passage of RCRA resulted in
shifting capitalization of a sound resource recovery
industry. In many instances, the policies and regulatory
requirements, which changed too rapidly, added to the
problem instead of solving it.
IV. Nuclear Energy
Events of the last several years have shown that the
initial era of nuclear power development is over. This is
reflected in the current state of affairs for the nuclear
industry. 88 An NRC panel recently recommended against
granting an operating license to Commonwealth Edison's
Byron nuclear power plant, already built at a cost of $3.5
billion. 89 Public Service Company of Indiana abandoned its
87. See United States v. Stringfellow, No. CV-5-2501-MML (C.D. Cal. 1984)
(Superfund Cleanup orders on summary judgment motions filed April 5, 1984), and
United States v. Environmental Conservation & Chemical Corp., No. 1P-83-14190
(S.D. Ind. 1983). See also supra note 66.
88. See infra notes 91-97 and accompanying text; See infra note 111.
89. Deepening Nuclear Woes, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1984, at D1, col. 3.
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Marble Hill nuclear power plant because of lack of money. 90
Cincinnati Gas & Electric's Zimmer plant will be
abandoned, and may even be converted to a coal-fired
plant.91 Long Island Lighting Company's Shoreham plant
may never operate. 92 The Seabrook Station of Public Service
of New Hampshire may be abandoned.93 Washington
Public Power Supply System (WPPS) is unable to meet its
financial obligations, 94 incurred as a result of operations in
this area. With the exception of Commonwealth Edison,
each of these utilities, one a municipal entity, faces
bankruptcy unless rate or other relief is granted. 95
Here again, the regulatory system is not totally
blameless. 96 Shifting and changing requirements imposed
90. Half-Built Indiana Nuclear Plant Abandoned at a $2.5 Billion Cost, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 17, 1984, at Al, col. 1.
91. Nearly Completed Nuclear Plant Will Be Converted to Burn Coal, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 22, 1984, at Al, col. 5.
92. Cuomo Stays Open To Shoreham Plan, N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1983, atAl, col.
1.
93. N.H. PUC Would Delay Seabrook Unit, Nuclear Industry, Aug. 1982, at 18.
94. Surcharge Is Suggested at Washington Utility, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18,1983, at
D1, col. 1.
95. Brody, Nuclear Waste: Construction Delays Cast Cloud Over Utilities,
Barron's, June 13, 1983, at 13, col. 1.
- 96. Both the Atomic Energy Commission and its successor, NRC, have been
charged with failing to "deal adequately with reactor safety and waste disposal
problems." Yellin, High Technology and The Courts: Nuclear Power and The Need
For Institutional Reform, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 489,498 (1981). It has also been asserted
that Congress did not maintain effective control over the commercialization
process, compare 42 U.S.C. § 2013(A) (1976) (atomic energy program intended to
foster research and development in order to encourage maximum scientific and
industrial progress) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2012(d),(e),2133(b),2134(a),(d),2201(i),2232(a)
(1976) (generally recommending broad, vaguely defined safety regulations in
atomic energy development), define an institutional framework for managing
nuclear wastes, M. Willrich & R. Lester, Radioactive Waste 93 (1977), or provide
definitive reactor safety and siting standards, see Yellin & Joskow, Siting Nuclear
Power Plants, 1 Va. J. Nat. Resources L. 1 (1980). However, this author maintains
that the NRC's efforts in these areas were adequate. The interaction among
multiple enironmental, safety, and related regulatory proceedings involving a
number of federal and state agencies, which resulted in uncertainty, frustrated
development of predictable reactor safety, environmental, and waste disposal
policies, and helped to precipitate a negative public reaction with respect to
nuclear development.
17
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a heavy financial toll on reactor owners. In the nuclear
industry, the onus fell on huge utilities which had always
been financially sound. Fortunately, when the severity of
the economic loss became apparent, they were not in the
same precarious position as the solvent recovery companies
which were relatively undercapitalized. Perhaps that is
why there has not been the rash of bankruptcies in this
regulated industry as in the hazardous waste management
industry.
Nonetheless, these utilities are suffering severe problems.
Public antipathy to nuclear plants flared in the aftermath of
Three Mile Island. 97 Siting a new nuclear reactor now
involves long environmental hearings and controversy far
exceeding even that of the siting of a hazardous waste
landfill.
Furthermore, even if an NRC construction license is
granted, new design requirements and changes in plans98
could result in runaway costs during construction. 99
Additionally, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Pacific
Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation
& Development Commission'00 makes it possible for a state
to prevent the construction of a nuclear power plant
anywhere within its borders even after an NRC license is
granted. This also could cause disastrous financial loss. The
Shoreham, Seabrook, Marble Hill, WPPS, and Zimmer
experiences demonstrate that delays will raise projected
budgets tenfold, by compounding of interest on the capital
borrowed to construct the plant.' 0 ' Regulatory uncertainty
97. See generally Report to the President's Commission on the Accident At
Three Mile Island (1979). (also known as the Kemeny Report).
98. See Shapar & Malsh, Proposed Changes in the Nuclear Power Plant
Licensing Process: The Choice of Putting A Finger in the Dike or Building a New
Dike, 15 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 539 (1973).
99. See Scheibla, Legal Fallout Lethal? Recent Court Decisions Threaten
Nuclear Power, Barron's Oct. 4, 1976, at 3, col. 1 (survey of nuclear utility
companies indicated that a one-month delay in construction would cost millions of
dollars).
100. 103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983).
101. Inflation and postponement of return on large capital investments make
delay extremely costly to utilities.
[Vol. 1
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and delay 10 2 have been instrumental in virtually stopping
nuclear power development in the United States. 10 3
V. Acid Rain
Because the nature and scope of the acid rain problem
have not been clearly defined, 10 4 a great deal of skepticism
exists in both private'0 5 and public10 6 sectors as to whether
proposed legislation will solve the problem. Many scientists
dispute whether the acidity of lakes in the northeastern
region of the country is linked in any way to the sulfur
emissions from electric power plants in the midwest. 10 7
102. The licensing and construction of nuclear power plants requires nine to ten
years. Hennessey, Licensing of Nuclear Power Plants by the Atomic Energy
Commission, 15 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 487, 488 (1974); Phillips, President Nixon's
Energy Message and the Electric Generating Industry Lawyer, 6 Nat. Resources
Law. 537, 538 (1973).
103. See Maleson, The Historical Roots of the Legal System's Response to
Nuclear Power, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 597, 618 n.98 (1983).
104. Chemical reactions for the conversion of SO2 from stack emissions to acid
rain in the atmoshere are unclear. The sequence is partially but not precisely
understood. Sulfur and nitrogen oxide emissions (SO2 and NO 2) can react with
atmosheric oxidants, such as ozone (03), to form sulfates (SO4) and nitrates (NO3),
which can then combine with hydrogen from water vapor (H20) and nitric acid
(HNO3). The scope of the problem is also under debate. For example, early studies
suggested that acidic deposition might cause crop damage; however, later studies
indicate that crops face no real danger from acid rain. Routine application of
fertilizers outweigh any acid imput that acid rain might provide, and the lime that
farmers regularly add to their soil to counteract fertilizer induced acidity also
neutralizes any rain-borne acid. See Acid Rain Research: A Special Report, EPRI
J., Nov. 1983, at 8, 36. See also testimony of Kurt D. Anderson (New York Power
Pool) before the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment (Dec. 1,
1983); [14 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 572 (Aug. 5, 1983); [14 Current
Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 611 (Aug. 12, 1983).
105. Bagge, Acid Rain: Perspective of the National Coal Association, 14 Nat.
Resources L. Newsletter 3, at 3 (Summer 1982). [hereinafter cited as Bagge].
106. Riordan, Progress on Acid Deposition Research, 8 EPA J., Nov.-Dec. 1982,
at 21. [hereinafter cited at Riordan].
107. Bagge, supra note 110. One theory is that emissions of acid precursors
simply contribute to a massive pool of oxides in the atmoshere. The
transformation of such oxides may depend largely on low levels of catalysts, so a
given degree of emission reduction might yield no reduction at all in deposition
rates. Other areas of debate concern the georgraphical relationship of sources and
receptors and the related issue of what design of source control measures will
produce optimum benefits in receptor areas. See Kamlet, Acid Rain: An
Environmentalist's Perspective, 14 Nat. Resources L. Newsletter 6, 7 (1982).
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Even more scientists dispute whether a cutback in S02
emissions will yield a comparable or even a proportional
level of reduced acid deposition. 08 Henri Poincare', the
eighteenth century mathematician, said: "Science is built of
facts the way a house is made of bricks, but an accumulation
of facts is no more science than a pile of bricks is a house."109
So it is with the acid rain problem. There is an
overwhelming amount of scientific information available,
but much of it is inconclusive or unsubstantiated. An
adequate scientific foundation upon which we can erect a
firm set of decisions to deal with the acid rain
phenomenon" 0 does not exist.
Despite the scientific controversy, Congress has hastily
proposed legislation,"' largely in respose to domestic and
international pressure, 112 to attack a suspected source of the
problem. H.R. 3400 and its companion bills propose a
mandatory federal SO 2 reduction program for the electric
utilities in the hope that acid deposition would be reduced.' 13
Lake acidification is a highly charged environmental
concern among residents of the northeastern United States
and adjacent provinces of Canada. 114 But Congress cannot
guarantee that even a fifty percent reduction in emissions
from midwestern power plants would result in a reduction in
rainfall acidity in the Adirondack mountains, the New
England states, or in the eastern Canadian provinces. 115
108. Id.
109. Bagge, supra note 110, at 3; Riordan, supra note 111.
110. Riordan, supra note 111, at 20.
111. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
112. See generally Rejhon, Acid Deposition in North America: A Canadian
Perspective, 14 Nat. Resources L. Newsletter, at 1 (Summer 1982).
113. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 117.
115. See supra notes 109, 112. Instead of attacking the suspect or assumed
source of the problem, a more logical approach is to pursue mitigation measures
aimed at helping to reverse any environmental changes that have occurred. For
example, lake acidity can be neutralized by adding lime to the water. Even though
every lake is different and an individual treatment program might have to be
developed for each lake, the cost would be quite low compared to the multi-billion
dollar price tag of the proposed retrofit emission control program. The benefit of
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Acid rain legislation would require utilities to switch to
low-sulfur coal or to install expensive flue gas scrubbers. 118
The substitution of one raw coal with another that has a
lower sulfur content has several major disadvantages. One
disadvantage is cost. Low-sulfur coal typically carries a
price premium of up to thirty percent. 117 Moreover, if coal
switching becomes a reality, demand for low-sulfur coal
would rise, causing the premium to increase
significantly.118 Delivery cost must also be considered, since
most low-sulfur coal is from the western part of the United
States. The impact on the coal industry in northern
Appalachia and the midwest must also be taken into
account. 119 Thus, acid rain legislation impacts
detrimentally on our national energy policy of developing a
plentiful and reliable energy source based on our country's
total coal reserves.120
Additionally, H.R. 3400 would force utilities to build flue
gas desulfurization (FGD) systems. As described in a
previous section, the FGD process creates a solid by-
product. Consequently, there will again be a severe problem
as landfills for disposal will have to be sited. 121 The siting
this approach is that the measure focuses directly on the problem, not the
"perceived" source of the problem. See Acid Rain Research:A SpecialReport, EPRI
J., Nov. 1983, at 10.
116. Whitaker, Developing the Options for Emissions Control, EPRI J., Nov.
1983, at 51. [hereinafter cited as Whitaker]. See also Parkinson, A Shot of
Limestone May Cure S02Removal Woes, Chemical Engineering, Feb. 20, 1984, at
30 (refers to the retrofit costs and SO 2 removal capabilities of FGD systems)
[hereinafter cited as Parkinson].
117. Whitaker, supra note 121, at 42.
118. Id.
119. Environmental policy needs to be compatible with energy policy, which
mandates minimizing dependence on imported oil.
120. To the extent that acid rain legislation drives utilities toward use of low
sulfur oil (as an alternative to using coal), our country's dependence on imported
oil will increase, not decrease. Yet, national policy is to reduce independence on
Mideast oil supplies. Thus, acid rain policy collides with foreign policy.
121. Approximately 1000 acres would be required for a 1000 Megawatt (MW)
plant. Lecture by Professor Sarofim of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
at Union Carbide Corp. (Nov. 2, 1983); Whitaker, supra note 121, at 45; See
generally Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (lengthy discussion of
FGD technology with sketches of scrubbers).
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problem may be further complicated if the FGD by-product,
scrubber sludge, falls within the definition of "hazardous
waste." H.R. 3400 does not even address the problem of
siting FGD sludge landfills. 122 It is logical that any such
legislation should include strict and comprehensive federal
standards for siting scrubber sludge disposal sites.
Scrubbing also uses large quantities of water;123 yet, no
mention of water treatment or disposal appears in any of
the proposed bills.
Another problem is that while FGD is one of the few
technically feasible techniques that can achieve the
proposed sulfur-removal requirements, it is also one of the
most expensive. 124 The high capital cost is especially
undesirable in the retrofit situation where FGD systems
have to be squeezed into an older plant that has limited
remaining economic life. This expensive add-on solution
extends the depreciable life of these older relatively
inefficient units rather than encouraging their
replacement.125
Ill-conceived acid rain legislation would generate its own
uncertainties, as policies and regulations shift to meet new
philosophies. When Congress amended the Clean Air Act in
1977, it required that existing plants reduce their emissions
to insure attainment of federal National Ambient Air
Quality Standards. 126 New plants, however, would be held
to the tighter federal New Source Performance Standards
(NSPS). 27 The philosophy behind NSPS was that as older
plants were retired, their replacements would constitute a
higher percentage of our generating capacity; therefore, the
nation's air quality would improve while upgrading the
efficiency of generating plants. This sound policy was
122. H.R. 3400, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
123. Anywhere from 500-2800 gal./min. for 500 MW plant. Whitaker, supra note
124, at 45.
124. See Parkinson, supra note 121, at 30.
125. Id.; Whitaker, supra note 121, at 41; Bagge, supra note 110, at 5.
126. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7411(d) (Supp. V 1981).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (Supp. V 1981).
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based on realistic environmental and energy concerns.
However, the proposed acid rain legislation would force
utilities to shift investment capital from developing newer
systems that combine superior environmental performance
with improved energy and operational efficiency, to older,
less-efficient plants. 128 Legislation should allow the nation
to move forward to the next generation of coal plants rather
than tying us to continued use of older units that must be
modified for environmental compliance. If it is shown to be
necessary and desirable to reduce SO 2 emissions even more
than is presently required, the most reasonable approach
would be to modify existing Clean Air Act requirements to
provide for more rapid siting, licensing, and construction of
new efficient and less-polluting power plants. 129
In the past, effects from a slowdown in fossil fuel
development may have been mitigated by nuclear energy
development. Since nuclear development appears to be at a
standstill, 130 our national energy policy will suffer the full
effect from any reduced energy-related research and
development. Common sense dictates that the acid rain
problem should first be clearly defined. Only then should a
solution be developed which considers all the relevant
factors, including waste disposal and energy costs.13 1
128. New power generation technologies now being developed, like fluidized bed
combustion and gasification-combined cycle promise to produce electricity from
coal in a manner that is not only intrinsically cleaner but is also intrinsically more
efficient than conventional coal-burning power generation systems. Investing in
these new technologies, in addition to working on ;-ivanced retrofit emission
control, is important for the future of the coal industry in this nation. Whitaker,
supra note 124, at 51. See Parkinson, supra note 124, at 33; Coal-Cleaning Route
Gets Commercial Tryout, Chemical Engineering, Feb. 20, 1984, at 35.
129. Bagge, supra note 110, at 5.
130. See supra Section IV.
131. President Reagan appears to have recently accepted this position. See
Head of E.P.A. Defends Reagan Plan For Further Acid Rain Study, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 27, 1984, at A9; N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1984 at B8. See also Acid Precipitation
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 770 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
8901-8912 (Supp. V 1981)) (established the U.S. Interagency Task Force on Acid
Precipitation, representing a concerted, nationwide research effort to improve our
understanding of the causes, effects, and possible answers to the acid rain
question).
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VI. Conclusion
Uncertainty, delay, and shifting regulatory requirements
have a profound impact on regulated entities. The close
focus on efforts to solve specific problems often clouds from
view the ramifications of the big picture 132 - interrelated
energy and environmental regulations equally compatible
with a clean environment and sound operations of
regulated entities.
The plethora of changing requirements, imposed at
federal, state, and local levels tends to set off chaotic chain
reactions which often have a destructive effect on the
achievement of overall environmental and energy goals.
These reactions seem to be greatest when policies are
hastily created in response to uncertain factual situations.
Not every hazardous waste site is a Love Canal. Three
Mile Island was an isolated event. Acid rain is poorly
understood, yet there is strong pressure to spend $100 billion
to stop it.
The problem of uncertainty in environmental and energy
regulations is significant. It can be mitigated most
effectively by recognizing that environmental policies need
to be grounded on solid technical and economic facts. When
policies are merely responses to the cries of "Chicken Little"
that "the sky is falling," the overall objective of a clean
environment can be severely frustrated.
132. The recent remand by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit of the EPA's
"tall stack" rules has upset the settled expectations of many S02 emitters. Sierra
Club v. EPA, 719 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The remand puts in doubt the
assumption that stacks two and one-half times as high as nearby buildings will be
credited in ambient air quality analyses. EPA's response to the remand has been
to defer action on all pending applications for revisions to state implementation
plans under the Clean Air Act. See EPA Draft Interim Policy on Stack Height
Rules Pending Revision of Regulations in Response to Court Order, [14 Current
Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1516 (Dec. 30,1983). This has slowed progress on
planned coal conversions, meaning that more Arab oil and natural gas will be
burned while the costs of the pending coal conversion projects escalate with
inflation.
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